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Abstract
Tanzania is  still using paper ballots system as the only voting 
channel despite  the  fact  that  other  countries  have  already 
implemented remote electronic voting systems for their general 
and  parliamentary  elections. With the  rapid  evolution  of 
Information and  Communication Technology (ICT) in today’s 
world, Tanzania should as well seize the opportunity presented 
by ICT to modernize its electoral process. However, prior to the 
implementation of remote electronic voting technology, one of 
the  key  issues  that  should  be  addressed  is  the  security.  The 
importance  of  security  in  electronic  voting  system  has been 
recognized  for  some t ime  now  but  implementing a
comprehensive  security  solution has been  a challenging t ask. 
This  paper  proposes  a  secure  model  for  implementation  of 
remote electronic voting via mobile phone or Internet to be used 
for future presidential and parliamentary elections in Tanzania. 
We reviewed several remote electronic voting models, analyzed 
them, and identified their strengths and weaknesses as well as 
their  components.  As  a  result  of t his r eview  and  analysisthe 
secure remote electronic voting model was developed to meet
the requirements of Tanzanian citizens. Data was collected using 
structured  questionnaires.  The d ata  was  collected  from  (1) 
experts in the area of information security, (2) lawyers, and (3) 
election officials. 
Keywords: Remote Electronic Voting, Information Security, e-
Government, Public Key Infrastructure, Electronic Identity.
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and Rationale for the Research 
Citizens' participation in the political process is essential 
for  democracy t o  be m eaningful  and  feasible.  Voting,
though  it  requires  little  initiative  and  cooperation  with 
voters,  is  the  most  critical  and  a  widespread  form  of 
citizen involvement [1]. Traditionally, voting has been a 
manual and work-intensive operation in Tanzania. There 
are  numerous  problems  associated  with  the  current 
electoral  system.  For  example, the  reports  of g eneral 
elections of 2005 and 2010 [6] [17] have made reference 
to  irregularities  in  counting.  There  is  also  a  serious 
problem concerning voters' turnout. According to the 
International  Institute  for  Democracy a nd  Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA), voters’ turnout statistics from recent 
elections in Tanzania shows a serious declining trend. For 
example, voters’ turnout in presidential election of 2010 
was 42.8 percent against 72.4 percent and 84.4 percent in 
presidential elections of 2005 and 2000 respectively. As 
the  country  is  striving  to  improve  its  democracy,  this 
alarming situation needs to be addressed. Countries with 
similar  problems  have  introduced  electronic  voting  via 
mobile phone and/or  Internet  in  an attempt to  alleviate 
low  voters'  turnout  problem.  These  countries  include 
Brazil, Canada, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Ireland, 
Italy,  Netherlands,  Nigeria,  Norway,  South  Africa, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom (UK), and United States of 
America  (USA)  [3].Literature  review  shows  that
electronic  voting  was  successful  in  some  countries
including Estonia and Switzerland while others such  as 
USA and UK have stopped using them due  to  security 
concerns  [1][18]. With  rapid  evolution  of  ICT  and 
significant  investments  in ICT,  it  is  important  for  the 
government to start initiating the remote electronic voting 
project. However, prior to the implementation of remote 
electronic voting in the country, one of the most important 
issues to be addressed is the security. This paper proposes 
a secure model for implementation of remote electronic 
voting via mobile phones or Internet to be used for future 
presidential and parliamentary elections in Tanzania. The
model  is  also  grounded  on  our  earlier  study  which 
measures  readiness  of c itizens  for  remote  electronic 
voting in Tanzania [12].
1.2 General Objective
The general objective of this research was to develop a 
secure model for implementation of the remote electronic 
voting system via mobile phones or Internet to be used for 
future general and parliamentary elections in Tanzania.
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Towards  achieving  the  general  research  objective, 
specific objectives were as follows;
i. To  identify  security c hallenges from  the 
technical  perspective  that hinder  the 
implementation  of r emote  electronic  voting in 
Tanzania.
ii. To identity security requirements for the remote 
electronic voting system.
iii. To  design  a secure  remote  electronic  voting 
model  for  Tanzania to  overcome  security 
challenges.
2. Related Work 
2.1 Current  Status  on  ICT  Infrastructure 
Development in Tanzania
According  to  data  provided  by I TU  in  2013,  over  2.7 
billion people used the Internet, which corresponds to 39 
percent of the world’s population. Tanzania accounts only 
for 5 percent of the mobile phone users  in Africa [11]. 
According to figures from the Tanzania Communication 
Regulatory A uthority  (TCRA),  in  2013  there  were 
169,165 landline and 26.5 million mobile phone users in 
Tanzania. Like  most of  the  African  countries, Tanzania 
has  recorded  exponential  growth  in  mobile  phones  as 
depicted in Fig. 1.
Fig: 1: Trend of mobile and fixed line subscription in Tanzania, 
adopted from TCRA [20].
Although indicators show rapid growth in the Tanzanian 
ICT infrastructure, communication facilities are available 
mainly in the urban areas leaving the rural areas (where 
the majority of Tanzanians live) being underserved owing 
to the challenges of cost, electricity and connectivity [19].  
According to the statistics of 2013, only 18.4 percent of 
the total population was connected to the national power 
grid  with  two percent of t hese being in  the  rural  areas 
[16].This is one of the reasons why rural areas have less 
ICT  facilities  and  infrastructure  as  compared  to  urban 
areas.  Moreover that the government of Tanzania spent 
over  250 billion  in  investment  of N ational  Information 
and  Communication  Technology  Broadband Backbone 
(NICTBB),  but  still  the  NICTBB  is  not  being  fully 
utilized  to  its  potential.  The  backbone  is  currently 
operating at less than 10 percent of its installed capacity 
and even lower at its design capacity [13]. This will affect 
largely the  use  of remote  electronic  voting via internet 
especially in urban areas.
With  regards  to  security, the  government is  currently 
issuing  national  digital  identity c ards  equipped  with  a 
computer-readable microchip. The microchip contains all 
the  information  and  personal  data  of  the  citizens, 
cryptographic  keys,  random  number  generators  and 
algorithms  needed to  carry  out all the  computations on 
behalf o f  the  voter.  It  also  contains  an  image  of  the 
citizen,  as  well  as  their  fingerprints  [21].  The  problem 
with  the  current digital  electronic  cards being issued  is 
that  a  complete  PKI  support  is  yet  to  be i mplemented 
[12]. However, plans are underway to have the complete
PKI implemented. 
2.2 International  Experience  with  Remote 
Electronic Voting 
Several  remote  electronic  voting  models  have  been 
implemented  worldwide  using  various  security c ontrols 
Qiuel et  al. discuss mobile  devices  mediated electronic 
voting system based on the distributed encryptions [22].
The authors apply the standard cut-of-the-choose method 
to  avoid  the  computational  zero  knowledge  proofs  and 
show that the proposed scheme is efficient and secure in 
the simulation-based paradigm. Another model of interest 
is  a Secure  Electronic  Registration  and  Voting 
Experiment (SERVE) which was introduced  in  2004 in 
USA. SERVE is the Internet based voting system built for 
the  Department  of D efense’s  federal  voting  assistance 
program.  However,  the  project  was  abandoned  due  to 
anonymity i ssue where the  web  server  could know  the 
vote  of e ach  voter.  There  were  no  public  key 
infrastructure  and  digital  identity  cards  used for 
authentication  in  SERVE  [17]. UK  embarked  on 
electronic  voting  project  aiming  at  modernizing  the 
electoral system However, despite extensive research, part 
of the problem with the UK trials is that time for testing 
and developing the system was inadequate and as a result 
the experiments were terminated due to security concern
[1].  In  2009 Norway initiated  a  procurement procedure 
for "E-valg 2011", an electronic voting pilot project for 
2011  municipal  and  regional  elections  [3]. The  main 
feature of the Norwegian electronic voting model is its 
openness.  Thus  Norwegian  government  attempted  to 
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documents  related to  voting  publicly  available  [3].  The 
model provides security measures against the two major 
security  issues,  compromised  computers  and  coercion. 
Two independent channels were introduced (postal mail 
and  SMS)  to  provide  safeguard  against  compromised 
voter’s computer. The Norwegian model also uses double 
envelope system to  insure integrity of votes and voter’s 
secrecy [3].
Many o ther  remote e lectronic  voting  models,  such  as 
Australian and Canadian models have been implemented 
over  the  years.  However,  most  of t hese  models  have 
limitations. For example, Canadian and Australian modes 
they  both  lack  secrecy  protection  measures  [3].  In  this 
view,  our  work  focused  on  analyzing  two  remote 
electronic  models:  Estonian  model  [10]  and  the  Swiss 
model [9] which address most of the security issues.
2.3 Security Requirements for Remote Electronic 
Voting
As  a  general  rule  the  remote  electronic  voting  system 
must  comply  with  all  the  principles  of  democratic 
elections and referendums. Remote electronic voting must 
be reliable and secure as traditional democratic elections 
and  referendums  which d o  not  involve  the  use  of 
electronic means [4]. In particular, security requirements 
for remote electronic voting are as follows:(1) to keep all 
votes secret (2), to ensure accuracy of the system without 
interference  or  errors,  (3)  to  achieve  democracy  by 
allowing  legal  voters  to  vote  only once,  (4)  to provide 
individual and universal verification to ensure that votes 
are  counted  correctly,  and (5)  to  ensure  the  system is 
available  and  accessible  for  all  voters  and  free  from 
possibility to declare results before the election closes [4].
2.4 Analysis of the Selected Models 
We  reviewed  and  analyzed  several  remote  electronic 
voting  models  with  respect  to  security. Strengths  and 
weaknesses of each model were identified. Based on this 
review and analysis the most secure models (Swiss and 
Estonian)  were  customized  and  enhanced  to  produce  a 
secure  model  that  suite  the  requirements of T anzanian. 
This section gives a detailed review and analysis of the 
selected models with respect to security.
2.4.1 Estonian Model 
Estonia  is  one  of  the  few  countries  in  the  world 
continuously u sing  an  Internet  voting  system [5]  The 
Estonian  model  is  based  on  three  principles:  (1)  the 
identity card for voter identification, (2) the possibility of 
re-voting  electronically w ith  only  the  final  ballot 
counting, and (3) the priority of traditional voting (should 
an  elector  vote  by p aper  ballot  on  election  day t heir 
electronic  ballot  is  deleted).  Other  key  requirements  to 
which  the  model  is  required  to  comply w ith  include 
reliability,  security,  transparency  and  auditability [ 2]. 
Fig.5  shows  a  high  level  architecture  of t he  Estonian 
model.
Fig. 2: Estonian electronic voting model, adopted from Chowdhury [5]
Remote  electronic  voting  in  Estonia  is  meant  to 
supplement the traditional methods of voting. The idea is 
to give voters the possibility to vote from the location of 
their choice without the necessity of going to the polling 
station [15].
2.4.1.1 Security Analysis 
Despite  its  acceptability  by m ajority  of E stonians,  the 
model  has  problems  that  have  not  been  addressed. 
Foremost,  the  implemented  electronic  voting  model  is 
only provided in Estonian language despite the fact that 
there  is  a  very  large  Russian-speaking  population  in 
Estonia.  This  has  created  a  barrier  resulting  in  many 
Russian  speakers  not  voting  online  [2]. The  Estonian 
electronic  voting  system  is  also  vulnerable  to  many 
security attacks. The common sources of vulnerabilities 
are described below [5].
(i) Voter Computer (VC): The computer could be 
virus  affected  or  affected  by a ny k ind  of 
malware. A malicious computer can cast a vote 
without concern of the voter.
(ii) Voter  Forwarding  Server  (VFS): The 
communication  link  between v oter’s  computer
and VFS is Internet. There are different kinds of 
attack  in  this  communication  link.  Internet 
connection provider can stop the traffic or delay 
the traffic. Since VFS is in open Internet, denial 
of service attack is also possible against VFS.
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application faults enable irregular access to data 
and  ignoring  restrictions,  therefore  the  fault-
freeness  of V SS  applications  is  also  a  major 
security issue.
(iv) Voter  Counting  Server  (VCS): VCS  is  the 
most  important  component  in  the  system.  The
public key of VCC is open to all voters and used 
in  encryption  of  the  vote.  VCA  private  key 
should under no  conditions become public and 
must not under any  circumstances be destroyed 
or become unusable. The source of vulnerability 
in VCS is from operating system, memory or any 
kind of virtualization.
(v) Voter  Anonymity: VSS  has  encrypted  and 
signed vote. VSS can identify the voter from this 
encrypted and signed vote but cannot decrypt the 
vote. Only VCS can decrypt the vote. If VFS and 
VCS both are corrupted then it  can  violate the 
voter’s anonymity. Because VSS can unwrap the 
digital  signature  and  mark  the  vote  by t ime 
stamp or any  other means then can send this to 
VCS. VCS can decrypt the vote and learn about 
the  choice.  Now  if  VSS  and  VCS  collaborate 
together it can identify the voter and learn about 
his choice.
2.4.2 Swiss Model 
The remote electronic voting model used in Switzerland is 
an  adaptation  of i ts  postal  model.  From  security 
perspective  Switzerland  does  not  use  digital  signatures 
like Estonia. However, the system operates similarly with 
respect to the envelope feature which keeps the ballot and 
voter’s identity separate [3]. Fig. 6 shows architecture of 
the Swiss electronic voting system.
Fig 3: The concept of Swiss electronic voting system, adopted from 
Giampiero [9]
2.4.2.1 Security Analysis 
Despite its success, Switzerland faces security challenges. 
With  the  system  used  so  far  in  electronic  voting  trials 
“citizens  cannot verify if t heir vote has been registered 
and  counted  correctly [ 7]. Like  Estonian  system.  Swiss 
system is also subjected to various security threats. These 
threats  include  (1)  denial  of  service  attack, (2)  vote 
buying and coercion, and (3) web spoofing [8].
2.4.3 Comparison of the Selected Model 
We conducted comparative study of s ecurity a spects of 
the two selected remote electronic voting models (Swiss 
and Estonian). Based on this comparison, the Tanzanian 
model  was  then  developed  addressing  the  identified 
security  gaps.  Table  1 shows  a  comparison  between 
Estonian and Swiss models.
Table 1: A comparison of electronic voting models 
against voting principles.
S/N Criteria Estonian Model Swiss Model
1 Legal basis
Electoral Act is in 
place but there are no 
detailed and 
comprehensive 
regulations on remote 
electronic voting.
The 
constitutional 
disposition on 
remote 
electronic 
voting has been 
adopted in a 
popular vote in 
February 2009.
2 Advance 
voting
Advance voting is 
allowed for electronic 
voting.
Advance voting 
is allowed for 
electronic 
voting.
3
Voter 
identificatio
n 
mechanisms
(i) ID card,
(ii) digital ID card 
(without picture, 
signature and other ID 
features),
(iii) mobile ID.
(i) Password,
(ii) birth date,
(iii) 
municipality of 
origin.
4
Intellectual 
property 
rights of the 
Internet
System
The owner of the 
system is the National 
Electoral Committee.
The state of 
Switzerland 
owns the 
intellectual 
property rights.
5
Vote 
verification 
mechanisms
Neither return codes 
nor end-to-end 
measures are 
foreseen.
None for the 
voters.
6
Secrecy 
protection 
mechanism
Beyond the 
cryptographic 
measures, the system 
also allows multiple 
voting and paper 
ballots during the 
advance period.
The voter 
register 
uploaded into 
the system is 
fully 
anonymous. 
Voters are only 
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their one-time 
voter number.
7 Open/closed 
source code
Not all source codes 
are disclosed to the 
public.
Not fully 
available to the 
public The 
conditions for 
accessing the 
source code are 
set by the 
government.
8
System 
testing and 
certification 
mechanisms
Formal certification is 
not foreseen.
Formal 
certification is 
not foreseen.
9
Voting and 
results audit 
mechanisms
No specific voting 
and results audit 
mechanisms.
Forensic 
statistic tests are 
systematically 
performed on 
the result of the 
electronic 
voting channel.
10 Supported 
languages Estonian
Multilingual 
(Italian, French, 
Rhaetian and 
German).
3. Methodology
3.1 Identification of Security Challenges 
In  identifying  security  challenges hindering  the 
implementation  of r emote  electronic  voting  data  was
collected using structured questionnaires from (1) experts 
in the area of information security, (2) lawyers and (3) 
election officials.
3.2 Population and Sampling Method
Our s ample  was  drawn  from  the  governmental
organizations.  We  only s elected  those  government 
organizations  which  have  direct  responsibility o f 
managing  electoral  process  and  supporting role  to 
facilitate elections in the country. These organizations are 
referred to as organizations A and B. The actual names of 
these organizations are not revealed in this paper due to 
confidentiality  concerns.  Organization  A  is  an 
independent  entity r esponsible  for  managing  electoral 
process  in  the  country  whereas.  Organization  B  is  a 
government  agency r esponsible  for  overseeing  the 
implementation  and  management  of n ational  identity
system in the country. The total population was 342. The 
sample size was computed by the following formula [14]
  q p Z N e
N q p Z
n
   
  

2 2
2
1
……………...………..(1)
Where  N  =  size  of p opulation,  n  =  sample  size, e  = 
acceptable margin error (the precision = 0.05), Z= Z value 
at  95  percent  confidence  level  (1.96),  p  =  sample 
proportion, q = 1 – p; where q= 0.5.
The  calculated  sample  size  of t he  population  was  181.
Table  2 presents  the  estimated number of p ersonnel  in 
each of the selected organizations.
Table 2: Number of personnel in the selected organizations
Position Organization A Organization B Total
ICT and ICT 
security 
personnel
16 18 34
Legal officers 5 3 8
Operations 
personnel 127 132 269
Upper 
management 10 31 41
Total workforce 158 184 342
3.3 Data Collection
Primary d ata  was collected  using  structured 
questionnaires from  (1)  experts  in  the  area  of   
information  security,  (2)  lawyers,  and  (3)  election 
officials. We also conducted literature review on remote
electronic voting models implemented in other countries.
3.4 Reliability and Goodness of Fit Measurement
The  reliability t est  was  conducted  by u sing  Statistical 
Package  for  Social  Sciences  (SPSS)  to  analyze  the 
internal  consistence  of  the  questions;  the  calculated 
Cronbach’s  alpha  was  0.993  and  was  most  suitable. 
Furthermore, a  Chi-square test was conducted to  assess 
goodness  of f it  for  all  research  questions.  The  results 
show statistical significance.
3.5 Data Processing and Analysis
The content analysis technique was used  for  processing 
and analyzing descriptive data. We also used SPSS and 
Microsoft Excel to analyze data and present the results.
3.6 Designing  of  a  Secure  Remote  Electronic 
Voting Model 
The  second  research  objective  was  to  design a secure 
remote electronic voting model. The model was mainly 
designed using the desk review technique. We reviewed 
several remote electronic voting models, analyzed them, 
and identified their strengths and weaknesses as well as 
their components. During the design process a number of 
ACSIJ Advances in Computer Science: an International Journal, Vol. 3, Issue 4, No.10 , July 2014
ISSN : 2322-5157
www.ACSIJ.org
99
Copyright (c) 2014 Advances in Computer Science: an International Journal. All Rights Reserved.electronic voting professionals were also consulted. These 
professionals  included (1)  experts  in  the  area  of 
information  security,  (2)  lawyers,  and  (3)  election 
Officials These professionals were  selected  using  a 
purposive sampling technique
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Security Challenges 
4.1.1 Low  Robustness  and  Security  of  ICT 
infrastructure 
Although  the  government has  established a  National 
Information and Communication Technology  Broadband
Backbone, there is no government-wide established ICT 
security architecture and standardization. The majority of 
respondents (69 percent) affirmed that  the existing  ICT 
infrastructure  was  established  without  taking  into 
consideration ICT security issues.
4.1.2 Client- Side Attacks
Voters  will  be u sing  their mobile  phones or  computers
connected  to  the  Internet to  cast  their  votes.  Mobile 
phones  and  computers  are  vulnerable  to  attacks  and 
cannot be  controlled  by  National  Election  Commission
and therefore it is difficult to  apply c ountermeasures at 
client side. The majority of the respondents (77 percent) 
were  concerned  that  unreliable voters  computers or 
mobile phones would create serious problems leading to 
compromising  the integrity o f  the  entire  election.
Depending  on  the  nature  of  the  attack,  possible  risks 
could be as follows: (1) an attacker may randomly alter a 
voter’s choice without the user noticing, (2) an attacker 
can impersonate a real voter and cast the vote instead of 
the real voter, (3) an attacker could tamper with secrecy 
by recording the voter name and choice to then be made 
public,  and (4)  an  attacker can  also launch a denial of 
service attack to the voter’s machine and hence hinder the 
possibility of the voter to vote. Fig. 2 illustrates an attack 
to voter’s computer or mobile phone.
Fig. 4: Attacks to the client computers/mobile phones
Other  security  threats  at  the  client  side  include  voter 
coercion and vote buying which are described in  detail 
later in this paper in sub-section 4.6.
4.1.3 Internet-Side/ GSMAttacks
Respondents (84 percent)  were  concerned that,  since 
electronic votes will be transmitted via Internet or GSM 
network, an attacker can affect integrity, availability and 
confidentiality of t he  votes. Fig. 3 illustrates attacks to
internet or GSM infrastructure.
Fig. 5: Attack to Internet/GSM infrastructure
4.1.4 Server-Side Attacks
Respondents (92 percent) were concerned that there was a 
possibility  for  an attacker  to  interact  with  the  remote 
electronic voting  system,  its  interfaces  or parts of i t  to 
exploit vulnerabilities. This may compromise security and 
affects  all  voting  system  components.  This  can  be 
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scale fraud in order to safeguard their political interests. 
There is also a possibility for denial of service attack that 
would  prevent voters  from  casting  their  vote  in  the 
system. This may result into having the legitimacy of the 
whole  election being  compromised. Fig. 4 illustrates 
attacks to electronic voting servers
Fig. 6: Attack to electronic voting  servers
4.1.5 Voter Coercion and Vote Buying 
The  majority  of r espondents  (84  percent) were  also 
concerned  that, unlike  in  developed  countries, remote 
electronic  voting  in Tanzania  would present  a  greater
opportunity for voter  coercion or vote-buying. Coercion 
or vote buying takes place when a voter is pressured by 
others  to vote in  a way that he o r she would not have 
otherwise. This high level of v ote buying and  coercion
was  linked  to  the high  level of c orruption  and poverty     
in the country.
4.2 A  Proposed  Tanzanian  Secure  Model  for 
Remote Electronic Voting.
We propose a secure model for remote electronic voting 
system that suits  the  needs of Tanzanian elections. Our
model  is based on  the  country’s  electronic government 
framework.  The  proposed  model  was  developed 
following  the  customization  of E stonian  and  Swiss 
Models. Unique features that distinguish our model from 
Swiss and  Estonian models  are as  follows:  (1) 
introduction  of  bilingual  local  content (Swahili  and 
English) to enable majority of Tanzanians to utilize the
system  effectively,  (2)  implementation  of  public  key 
infrastructure and the use of three-factors authentication 
mechanism  which  is  enabled  by u sing  Tanzanian
electronic  identity  cards for identification  and 
authentication of voters, (3) the use of confirmation code 
for transparency while maintaining secrecy of the votes, 
and (4) introduction of  an independent body f or system 
testing and accreditation.
Other  key p rinciples  to  which the  model  is required  to 
comply with include: (1) reliability, (2) auditability, (3) 
capability to  vote several times electronically with only 
the final ballot counting, and (4) an option to vote at  a 
polling station. The proposed model is also characterized 
by its modular and service-oriented architecture (see Fig.
8),  which  allows  the  integration  of  mobile  phones and 
Internet  for electronic  voting. Moreover,  the  model  is 
grounded on our earlier study which measured readiness 
of citizens for remote electronic voting in Tanzania [13].
4.2.1 Technical Aspects of the Proposed Model 
- Addressing  the Technical Security 
Challenges 
4.2.1.1 Voters Identification  and  Authentication 
Mechanism 
We  propose three-factor  authentication mechanism  for 
identification and  authentication of eligible voters. This 
will be enabled by Public Key  Infrastructure (PKI) and a 
national electronic identity card (e-ID card).Before a vote 
is cast, a voter must be provided with e-ID card with PKI
capability. Currently the government is issuing e-ID but a 
complete public key infrastructure is yet to be established 
The proposed processes for producing an e-card with PKI 
enabled are illustrated in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7: Digital certificates issuing process
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Parties
In  this  sub-section, we  specify t he  proposed  system’s
components  and  describe  their  functionality  and 
interfaces.  We  also  describe the participating parties  in 
the  system. Fig. 8 presents  the proposed  system 
architecture.
Fig  8: Remote  electronic  voting  system  architecture  — major 
components of the system, and how information flows between them.
As shown in Fig. 8, the proposed model consists of the 
following components.
(i) Electronic  Voting  Client  Application (e_VCA):
This is an application that runs on voter’s computer 
or  mobile  phone.  The  application  consists  of  the 
candidate information, the key storage and generation 
functions
(ii) Electronic Voting Central System (e_VCS): This is 
a core system responsible for collection of electronic 
ballots,  storage  and  tabulation.  The roles  of t he 
e_VCS  are  fulfilled  by  four different  servers as 
follows.
(a) Mobile Authentication Module (MAM) which is 
an entity within GSM network but is considered as 
part  of e lectronic  voting  central  system.  This 
component is used to authenticate voters who would 
like to vote via mobile phones. MAM generates the 
authentication  parameters  and  authenticates  the 
mobile phone users.
(b) Vote Relying Server (VRS) which is responsible 
for authenticating voters who would like to vote via 
internet,  distributing electronic ballot to  voters  and 
accepting  the  votes.The  VRS  should  be  available 
over the Internet.
(c) Vote Storage Server (VSS) which is responsible 
for  storing  the  electronic  votes  over  the  period  of 
time and for the  anonymization of the votes before 
the actual tabulation is done. The VSS should be kept 
behind a firewall.
(d) Vote Counting Server (VCS) which is responsible 
for the tabulation process. VCS should be offline at 
all the times to avoid attack. 
(iii) Receipt  Generator. This  component is responsible 
for  computation  of c onfirmation  codes.  The 
confirmation codes are sent directly to the voters, as 
shown in Fig. 8, and this has to be done through an 
independent  channel.  After  receiving  this  feedback 
the voter can compare between his choice of options 
and  receipt  code,  If  the  receipt  codes  matches  the 
selected  options,  the  voter  can be  assured  that  his 
vote is recorded as intended.
(iv) Key Management Server (KMS): This component 
generates and manages the key pair(s) of the system. 
The  public  key ( keys)  are  integrated  into  e_VCA, 
private key(s) are delivered to VCS
(v) Auditing Module: This component is an application 
which solves disputes and complaints, using logged
information from the central voting system 
(vi) Population Register : This component is a database 
for  citizens'  personal  data.  It  is  maintained  by 
National Identity Authority
(vii) Voters and candidate registers: This is a database 
for  eligible  voters  and  candidates.  The  database  is 
maintained by National Election Commission 
(viii) Digital Certificate  Validation  Server. This  server 
checks the  validity o f  digital  certificates  of e -card 
holders.  The  server  should  be o perated  by 
independent entity.
4.2.2 Proposed  Remote E lectronic  Voting 
Process
The proposed model requires that the process of casting a 
vote  start  with  the  voter  receiving  a  voting  card  from 
National Election Commission sent by postal/mail or any 
other  secure  channel.  The  voting  card  should  contain 
necessary i nformation  for  the  voter,  as  well  as  pre-
computed random generated receipt codes corresponding 
to possible voting options on the election ballots. These 
codes  will  be  uniquely g enerated to  the  voter,  but  are 
random and cannot reveal what the voter voted. When the 
period of advance voting opens, an eligible voter can use 
mobile  phones  or  Internet  to  cast  a  vote.  If the  voter 
decides to vote via Internet, the processes are as follows;
i. The  voter  launches  the  client  application  and 
inserts  her  ID  card  and  enters  the first  PIN 
number to  establish Secure  Socket  Layer(SSL) 
connection.  The  client  verifies  the  server’s 
identity using a hard-coded certificate.
ii. Once a secure connection between a  client and 
VRS is established, the  client sends a  message 
with  its  credentials  (second  pin  number  and 
fingerprint) digitally signed with its private key 
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certificate.
iii. VRS then validates the digital certificate of the 
voter
iv. VRS checks if the voter is eligible using the data 
from  the  population  register  maintained  by 
National  Identity A uthority.  If  the  voter  is not 
eligible, a corresponding message is delivered. If 
the voter is eligible, VRS performs a query from 
the VSS whether such voter has already voted. If 
this is the case, the voter is informed about it.
v. The voter receives electronic ballot and select a 
candidate 
vi. VFS asks the user to confirm the choice.
vii. When issued a choice of candidate and political 
party the voter clicks to submit the vote. 
viii. e_VCA encrypts voter’s  choice and a random 
number  with  the  public  key o f  the  VSS.  The 
voter  signs  the  entire  package  (as a  double 
envelope scheme) with private key that belongs 
to him
ix. E_VCA transmits the digitally signed envelope 
to the VRS which verifies the formal correctness 
of the received material.
x. The entire envelope is then sent to VSS.  
xi. In c ase  of s uccessful  vote  the  VSS  sends  the 
VRS  a  confirmation  that  the  vote  has  been 
received. The voter receives an SMS containing 
the  receipt  code  corresponding  to  the  vote  he 
issues, and can verify this code is correct against 
the codes on his voting card. By this mean the 
voter  can  for  instance  detect  if a  m alicious 
program on his computer has changed the ballot. 
The receipt code can also be used for the voter to 
verify his vote is present in the latter e-counting 
process. 
xii. An entry about receiving of the vote is recorded 
in the log-file 
xiii. Finally  VSS  separates  inner  envelopes  from 
outer envelopes and readies  them  for the Vote 
Counting Application(VCS)
If  the voter decides to vote through mobile phones, the 
voting  processes  are  the  same as f or  Internet  voting 
except  that  the voter  uses  a  mobile  phone  and 
authentication is done through the mobile authentication 
module instead of the vote relying server. 
The proposed GSM mobile voting scheme is part of the 
central voting system and thus voters can choose to vote 
through the Internet or the GSM network. If voters want 
to  vote  through  GSM,  they h ave  to  be r egistered  and 
obtain  a  special  SIM  card  with  the  embedded 
cryptographic algorithm and national identity. SIM cards 
should  be  registered  by m obile  phone  operators in 
collaboration with National Election Commission
4.2.3 Security Analysis 
In  this  section  we  critically analyze security  of t he 
proposed model and prove that the model conforms to the 
security requirements presented in Section 2.3. 
4.2.3.1 Public Key Management
The  core  component  that  provides  assurance  towards 
fulfillment of the main security requirements of electronic
voting (secrecy and integrity of the votes) is a public key 
management  module.  We  describe the  main concept 
behind public key management, main risks and possible 
controls. We use  asymmetric  cryptograph to ensure the 
secrecy of v oting in  the system  Under  this  scheme,  a 
system key pair is generated, the public part of which is
integrated into client software and is used to encrypt the 
vote. The private component of the key pair is used in the 
vote counting server to decrypt the vote. To increase the 
security of the private key of the counting server, the key 
should  only  be u sed during  counting period. When  the 
election period ends,  the private  key  must  be destroyed 
and should not be used in any other election. The secrecy 
of electronic voting can be compromised in two ways: an 
attacker  having access, first, to  the  private  key o f  the 
system and, second, to the digitally signed votes. Thus to
ensure the security the main focus should be on the key 
management module and especially protecting private key
because once the private key is compromised the entire 
encrypted votes can be decrypted. Generally the private 
key is subject to two major risks: (1) an attacker may be 
in possession of digitally signed electronic votes and be 
able to determine who casts a vote in favor of whom, thus 
compromising the privacy of the voter, and( 2) the private 
key carrier may be destroyed because of technical errors. 
When this happens, it becomes practically impossible to 
decrypt the electronic votes. This is a high concern and 
therefore we  propose  that  back-ups of t he k eys  pair 
should be available. These backups have to be properly 
protected. In our proposed model the key pair is generated 
in a Public Key Management Module (PKMM) in such a 
way that the private component never leaves the module. 
The generation of the key pair and use of the private key 
is maintained by key managers, there should be several of 
them. A scheme of “N out of M” is recommended where 
N is  less than  M. For National  Electoral Committee  N 
members out of M members should be present in order to 
decrypt the votes.
4.2.3.2 Identification,  Authentication  and 
Authorization 
The  proposed  main  form  of  voter  identification  and 
authentication  for  Tanzania  is  through  the  use  of a  
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Infrastructure  (PKI).  As  discussed  in  sub-section 
2.1,currently Tanzania is issuing e-cards but a  full PKI 
support is yet to be implemented. We therefore propose 
that full PKI and e-cards should be used for authentication 
and  identification  of  eligible  voters.  The  proposed 
processes of issuing an e-card with PKI are shown in Fig.
7. If fully implemented, the new e-card will support most 
authentication  technologies,  including storing  password, 
one-time  passwords,  biometric  image  templates,  PKI 
certificate and supports the generating of asymmetric key 
pairs. We propose asymmetric and hashing algorithms to 
be  used  as  cryptographic  solutions.  Each  card  should 
therefore contain two pairs of asymmetric keys. The first 
pair should be used for authentication and the second one 
digital signature. Certificates binding the public keys  to 
the cardholder’s identity should be stored on the card and 
in  an online database. As a n additional security control 
each key should be associated with a secret code (PIN) to 
authorize  every  operation. Unlike  Swiss and  Estonian 
models,  our model  supports  three-factor  authentication
based on (1) something one knows (PIN), (2) something 
one  has  (smartcard),  (3) something  one  is  (biometric
fingerprint). Despite  its  complexity, three-factor 
authentication  is  believed  to  be  the  most  effective
authentication mechanism.
At  the  start  of  each  election,  National  Election 
Commission  should  publish  a set  of  voting  client 
applications that  can  run  on  all the  available operating 
system platforms. We propose applications for Windows,
Linux, and Mac OS be available to enable a good number 
of voters participate in elections. The application should 
be  downloaded  from  the secure  website  that  has  to  be 
maintained  by National  Election  Commission. The 
current website of the National Election Commission does 
not use a secure hypertext protocol (shttp) and therefore,
unless this anomaly is rectified, cannot be used for remote 
electronic  voting.  The  client  software  should  be 
customized for  each  election  and  include  an election-
specific public key.
4.2.3.3 Ensuring Authenticity,  Secrecy and 
Integrity of the Votes 
To ensure votes authenticity, secrecy and integrity of the 
votes,  we  adopt  the  double  envelope scheme  adopted 
from  the  Estonian model  [10]. Under  this  scheme,  the 
vote  is  encrypted  with  the  vote  counting  server  public
key, while the corresponding private key does not exist 
before the polls close (inner envelope). The voter digitally 
signs  the  encrypted  vote  using  its  private  key  (outer 
envelope).  The  votes  are  collected,  sorted,  voter’s 
eligibility is verified and invalid votes are removed. Then
the outer envelopes (digital signatures) are separated from 
inner  envelopes  (encrypted  votes).  Voter  lists  are 
compiled  from outer envelopes. Inner envelopes (which 
are not associated with the identity of the voter any more) 
are  forwarded  to t he  vote counting  server. The  vote
counting  server decrypts  the votes using  is private  key 
and  produces  results  of  electronic  voting. Fig. 10
illustrates  a double  envelope  scheme  proposed for 
Tanzanian remote electronic voting system.
Fig. 9: A double envelope scheme
To  ensure  integrity  of t he  votes, a client  computes  a 
“digital  hash" of t he  encrypted  ballot  before the  voter 
sends it off. The vote storage server computes the same
“digital  hash” and  returns  this  hash  value  to  the  voter 
along with the confirming receipt. The voter then checks
that the two codes match, thus the voter can confirm that 
the integrity of the votes has not been compromised. The 
digital hash is a fixed-length value computed based on the 
encrypted ballot that  makes  it  impossible  for  either  the 
contents or length of the encrypted ballot to be recovered 
by t he  attacker.   T he  hash  value  provides  a  digital 
fingerprint of the encrypted ballot, which ensures that the 
ballot has not been altered by an intruder or virus, or by 
other means
4.2.3.4 Addressing  Coercion  and  Vote  Buying 
Issues
To prevent vote buying and coercion by technical means
is  practically  impossible  when voting  remotely.  To 
reduce negative consequences associated with this threat, 
a cancellation right is recommended. In this case voters 
will be allowed to submit multiple votes in advance with 
only last vote cast counted. Moreover, the buying of votes 
is precluded .i.e. a potential buyer can never ascertain that 
an electronic vote will actually becounted.
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the Server
There is no a technical solution that can totally prevent a 
Denial  of  Service  (DOS)  attacks.  However,  there are 
administrative controls to reduce the impact of the attack 
when  it  occurs.  To  reduce  the  impact  of  DOS  we 
recommend that advanced voting be allowed as discussed 
in sub-section 5.6.4. Moreover a robust disaster recovery 
plan  should  be  implemented to  minimize  the  impact 
associated with DOS attacks.
4.2.3.6 Ensuring Votes Verifiability
To  ensure variability  of t he  votes,  we  introduce  two 
mechanisms: Auditing  by independent  bodies  and  a
possibility for voters to verify using independent channel
that  votes are recorded  as  casted. Through independent
auditing we can ensure that every step of the election is 
working accordingly. Generally, all the processes of the 
system have to be audited. The voter can also verify that 
his ballot was included in the counting process. This can 
be  done  using  vote verification  code.  The  verification 
codes are computed by receipt generator. The verification
codes are sent directly to the voters, as shown in Fig. 8,
and this has to be done through an independent channel. 
After  receiving  this  feedback  the  voters can  compare 
between their choice of options and receipt code. If the 
receipt code matches the selected options, the voter can 
conclude that the vote is recorded as intended.
5. Conclusion
This  study  identified  security c hallenges  from technical 
perspective  that  hinder  the  implementation  of r emote 
electronic voting  in  Tanzania. The study  also identified 
security requirements that remote electronic voting must 
comply with. These requirements are in line with general 
principles  of d emocratic  elections. We  reviewed  and 
analyzed  several remote e lectronic  voting  models  with 
respect to security. Based on this analysis the most secure 
models  (Swiss and  Estonian)  were  customized  and 
enhanced  to  produce  a  secure  model  that  suite  the 
requirements of Tanzanian. We also demonstrate how the 
developed  model  if  well,  implemented will address  the 
identified challenges and hence conforms to the general 
principles of democratic elections. The model was mainly 
developed  using  desk  review  technique  in  consultation 
with  information  security,  information  technology  and 
legal experts. From technical perspective we see that the 
ICT infrastructure was implemented without taking into 
consideration  security  issues.  In  regard  to this  we 
conclude that the current ICT infrastructure in Tanzania 
does not provide a sufficient level of security with respect 
to authentication, identification and transmission of c ast 
votes. However, there is good reason to believe that the 
government  will  improve  security o f  the  existing  ICT 
infrastructure to enable secure elections through Internet 
or  Mobile  phones.  Another  issue  of c oncern  is  vote
buying  and  coercion  which is  likely t o  be h igher in 
Tanzania due to high level of poverty and corruption in 
the country. This will eventually affect principle of secret 
suffrage. To  reduce  negative  consequences associated
with this threat, a cancellation right is recommended. In 
this case voters will be allowed to submit multiple votes
in advance with only last vote cast counted.
Generally, for remote electronic voting to be successful, it 
is  very  important  that  proper security  controls are
implemented. The current information security landscape 
in Tanzania does not warrant this level of security. For 
this  reason,  we do  not  at p resent  recommend  the 
implementation of  a  full-scale  remote  electronic  voting 
system  in  the  country. O ur  proposed  model  and 
recommendations  should be s een  as  the  start of a  long 
term strategic objective. Nevertheless, we do not expect 
that  there will be pressure and rush to introduce remote 
electronic voting in the country. We strongly recommend 
that remote electronic voting should not be implemented 
prior  thorough  testing and  therefore we  emphasize the 
need for the government to initiate a number of pilot and 
test  projects.  Properly  planned  pilot projects and 
systematic evaluation should be done as soon as possible, 
with  the  aim  of  testing  various  technical  solutions and 
enhancing the  voters’  confidence  in  remote  electronic 
voting.
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